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Foreword
Michael Daxner1 and Urs Schrade2
Governance is neither a homogeneous field of research, nor are its diverse sectors equally acces-
sible for investigation. Generally speaking, the main sectors of Rule of Law and Security are much 
better analyzed than the third sector, Welfare Governance. There are some good reasons for that 
deficiency, and some not as good ones, especially when it comes to areas of limited statehood 
(ALS). Good reasons are that all development in welfare domains, such as health, education and 
social security, is slow and often not rewarding when it comes to reputation, recognition and 
alliances. It is also clear that most areas of welfare governance are under heavy tension, like the 
other two fields, concerning fights over values, traditions and habits. But, in particular, educa-
tion is a field that very often serves as a quid-pro-quo for much broader antagonisms in a soci-
ety. Not so good reasons for the deficiency in linking education to governance research in the 
non-OECD world are either the education field being one of the “sovereignty” reserves of any 
state, irrespective how weak its statehood is developed and its potential for good governance is 
developed, or the fact that education does not play a significant role in state-building until it 
is too late, i.e. until the lack of education hampers all other areas of consolidating statehood.
The project C9 of the SFB 700 deals with security and development in North-East Afghanistan. 
While it may appear at first glance that education does not play a dominant role in our inves-
tigations, indeed, it will be marginally highlighted in this study, e.g. when it comes to the im-
portance of girls’ schools or the education and training of government employees. Indirectly, 
we have learned and will continue to be aware of the impact of education on development and 
security. Education can, under different circumstances, contribute to both the stabilization and 
destabilization of a community. 
This working paper provides a brief and condensed outline of Higher Education governance in 
Afghanistan. We will not be going into the prevailing theories on education and Higher Educa-
tion in countries under intervention. However, since intervention is one of the most significant 
frames for analyzing anything in Afghanistan, and since the position of education and Higher 
Education is very significant for the framework of governance analyses at large, we hope to shed 
some light on a rather neglected aspect of welfare governance under the conditions of interven-
tion (since 2001) and transition (the period till 2014).
1 Michael Daxner is Professor of Sociology at the SFB 700 Free University of Berlin. His research is i.a. 
on Security and Development in Northeast Afghanistan and in Higher Education Planning Projects. 
His main field are societies of intervention and peace & conflict studies.
2 Urs Schrade, MA, is a doctoral candidate, supervised by Prof. Daxner, and a research associate in the 
Project on Afghan Higher Education Landscape for the Foreign Office, 2012. He also is the main inves-
tigator in the SAR monitoring violence and violation of academic standards in Afghan Higher Educa-
tion.
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Education, more than Higher Education, enjoys the strongest attribution of being a common 
good; therefore, it should be governed and administered by the state3. Opinions regarding 
Higher Education are less unanimous, but the focus is in all cases on access, admission and 
enrolment as public goods, only challenged by a club-good mentality by the wealthy and politi-
cal or ethnic elite. Since the enlightened age in the 18th cty., Higher Education has become a 
focus of dispute whether it can be regarded as a private good or a common good. The debate 
has been developed along the lines of ownership (who owns the universities, the state or private 
companies, or public non-state institutions?, profit-orientation (tuition or free study?)) and the 
legitimacy of the autonomous curriculum. We are not going into the details of the debate, but 
will make clear that the problem is not private or state ownership; the discussion is focused on 
the question, whether a common good is accessible for everybody who shows a certain qualifi-
cation or whether admission is reserved to certain groups, giving them a specific advantage over 
others. The modes of delivery play a role as well as the rule of law that may or may not regulate 
selection criteria for admission and enrolment. Another question is whether the state should 
decide upon disciplines, curriculum, syllabi and research, or the owners should, or the institu-
tions themselves can decide. The type of interdependence between the three actors is typical for 
the differentiation of Higher Education systems over time. Most of them are still attached to 
the nation-state. But upcoming globalization has shaken up the traditional leading models of 
Higher Education systems. The fight for the right models has also reached Afghanistan, where 
the issue of private and/or for-profit Higher Education is on the agenda; another issue that has 
yet to arrive is the integration of a research sector into Higher Education; some countries in the 
Soviet tradition, which is still strong in Afghanistan, tend to allocate research outside the uni-
versities in academies. For our context it is important to recognize that the relationship of both 
science and Higher Education with the state is one source of legitimacy the system of Higher 
Education is granted by the people.
Another base of legitimacy is the reward by graduating from a recognized institution of Higher 
Education. This reward can lie exclusively in cultural and social capitals without economic ef-
fect and little gain in power, it can become materialized in secure positions and a rise in career 
and payment, and, finally, it can be converted into economic and status gains by applying the 
qualification earned in Higher Education and its authorization for being accepted in some 
professions. For this act of authorization, the state is needed, even if the Higher Education field 
becomes totally privatized (this one of the few problems that OECD-countries share with the 
rest of the world). 
Since Afghanistan is no exception in many aspects of Higher Education under development, we 
shall concentrate on significant and important features concerning governance, especially the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of Higher Education governance.
3 Some new references to the debate concentrate on globalization as having a dubious effect on the 
claim to maintain HE as a common good: Philip Altbach, one of the international peers in the dis-
cipline, is sceptical about the effects of globalization: Altbach (2013). A sociological approach is being 
developed by Naidoo: Naidoo (2003). A very good overview on the debate is given by Chambers/Gopaul 
(2008). 
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Table 1: Participation in education4
Primary 
Schools
Secondary 
Schools
Higher 
Education
Population
2003
1,8-2,3 m
2,6 m (WB)
0,5 m
0,4 m (WB)
34.000
22.000 
(MoHE)
22 m
2010
5-6 m
4,9 m (WB)
5,4 m (MoHE)
2 m
2 m (WB)
70.000 27 m
2012
6-7 m
5,2 m (WB)
2,2 (WB)
2,0 (MoHE)
70-100.000 29 m
There are not many fields where legitimacy and effectiveness can be measured so clearly as 
they can be in the field of education. Legitimacy is given by legislation and administration of 
admission to school, by organizing fair and realistic catchments, hiring a large enough number 
of qualified teachers and providing a good curriculum for as many young people as possible. In 
other words, it is not enough to have some good teachers, some good curricula, some modern 
school buildings; it is the quantity that makes a system of education legitimate and links it to 
quite a few constitutional rights. This is one reason for the boisterous attitude of development 
collaborators in the Afghan intervention when they do “school count”, that is, when they mea-
sure the rise in the number of schools and rise in the number of students during the period of 
intervention.
But legitimacy is also conveyed by individuals – they must benefit personally from their share in 
the common good. This makes admission important for the link between the community and 
the individual; it is also a trigger the perception of legitimacy – why not me, and why so many oth-
ers? The answer is closely linked to perceptions of fairness, just distribution, access to resources, 
etc5.
Legitimacy is given to any school system that accepts one’s children for low or no tuition and 
provides a career in education, being aware of the “deferred gratification pattern” (Schneider 
1953)6, meaning that a good education with no income while studying will pay afterwards. The 
4 Figures taken from Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoHE), World Bank (WB) and other 
sources, as well as our own research (thanks to Clifford Mann). All numbers are estimates; only the 
dimension is relevant (Germany speaks of 8 m schoolchildren in 2010 based on a population of 30 m 
(Bundesregierung 2010)).
5 Most of our theory on the systems and structures of education and Higher Education are based on the 
theories of Pierre Bourdieu. Since the 1970s they influenced European and American sociology of edu-
cation. Among his most influential ideas are the concepts of habitus, cultural capital and the illusion 
of equality: cf. Bourdieu (1983); Bourdieu (1988), Bourdieu/Passeron (1971); Zembylas (2007), are among 
the texts that matter for our context. The ethnological and conflict-oriented research of Bourdieu will 
be mentioned later in this text. 
6 This approach has been extremely influential during the period of education reforms in Germany in 
the 1960s and 1970s.
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same is true to a certain extent in Higher Education. Here, however, we have a sharp town vs. 
countryside divide, because many parents from rural areas do not see the eventual rewards for 
investing in their children’s education instead of having them available as working hands for 
the family as soon as possible. We will not go into this problem here, but when we discuss town 
vs. rural areas, it should be kept in mind.
An education system is considered effective if a large number of graduates find employment on 
an expected or even higher level, i.e. when the demands from the labor market are met by the 
mass of graduates. But this only seems simple; it is, in fact, not a simplistic formula at all. You 
need quite a few matching conditions in the economic system, in the status hierarchy of society 
and in the areas of symbolic capital that have an immediate impact on the effective governance 
in education, and the category of efficiency is one of the most crucial because good education and 
Higher Education are expensive. Since all education and higher education are susceptible to 
certain ideological, religious and cultural influences, governance in this area is far more politi-
cal than, say, in road construction.
At the end of this foreword, we want to present five propositions and one thesis:
 Five Propositions: 
(1) The education system as a sector serves all three established fields of governance: rule 
of law, welfare and security. This sector is functional for delivering public goods such 
as titles, entitlements, authorization and legitimacy (RoL), social and cultural capitals 
and transferable, status-granting qualifications (welfare) and for guaranteeing basic 
requirements for a society’s security (and stability).
(2) Within Education, the tertiary sector – here, Higher Education (HE) – is the key dis-
tributor of deliveries to all three fields.
(3) Education plays a pivotal, though underrated, role in Afghan state-building and soci-
etal reconstruction.
(4) There are specific conditions for Higher Education governance that are likely to ap-
pear in humanitarian interventions, irrespective of local and national particularities.
(5) Good governance regarding Higher Education is the key factor in the equal devel-
opment of all three fields. Good enough governance neglects the key principles of 
inclusive policies to serve these fields.
One Thesis:
The intervention of 2001 has failed to develop afghan Higher Education to prepare 
for handover of responsibility and liability to the Afghan people; up until now, the 
transition period 2011-2014, Higher Education has never been functional under the 
imperatives of afghan needs, nor has it been prepared for a continuous handover by 
the intervention powers.
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Higher Education in Afghanistan – Governance at Stake
Michael Daxner and Urs Schrade
Abstract
Afghan Higher Education has become the most sensitive field of reforms on all levels of 
governance: rule of law, welfare and security. Compared to primary and secondary education, 
access to the universities is still a neuralgic point for status distribution and the stabilization 
of the entire system of education. Admission policies and traditional forms of reproduc-
ing disciplinary elites endanger a differentiated development of qualifications and diversified 
status. The Afghan system will need its own research in Higher Education, and then must 
develop a minimal base for disciplinary research. It is likely that Higher Education will play an 
important role during the transformation period 2014-2024 in fields like urbanization, emerg-
ing middle class elite, and serving schools by improved teacher training. It will be central to 
peace-building processes by comprehensive reforms in its governance structure. How much 
state will be needed in order to provide fair and equal access to the common good of Higher 
Education, and how much private and individual initiative must emerge in order to create 
quality and stability of the system? – These are central questions of this working paper.
Zusammenfassung
Das afghanische Hochschulsystem hat unter den Gewalteinwirkungen eines dreißigjährigen 
Krieges stark gelitten und kann die Erfordernisse eines modernen tertiären Sektors nicht 
erfüllen. Diese sind ihm durch die Intervention ab 2001 und die Aussicht auf eine Transfor-
mationsperiode 2014-2024 aber auferlegt. Die Governance von Hochschulsystemen greift tief 
in das Rechtssystem, in die Wohlfahrtspolitik und in die Gewährleistung von Sicherheit ein. 
Nicht nur Legitimation durch Statuszuweisung und Effektivität durch Allokation von Quali-
fikationen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sind gefragt. Die Zulassungspolitik zur Universität kann 
schon vor der Politisierung durch die Hochschule zu gewaltsamer Destabilisierung führen. 
Die Einbettung der afghanischen Hochschulen in das globale System der akademischen Re-
geln wird ebenso erörtert wie Beispiele für Fehlentwicklungen und mögliche Reformen. Für 
weiteren friedlichen Aufbau sind bestimmte Voraussetzungen im Hochschulbereich auch de-
shalb zwingend, weil sie Entscheidungen über den Grad an Staatlichkeit und nichtstaatlicher 
Initiative festlegen sollten.
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1. Introduction
Recent interventions, post “post-colony” type are likely to produce certain kinds of societies of 
methods of intervention (Bonacker et al. 2010; Daxner 2010b; Distler 2009; Free 2010; Koehler 
2010). Action-oriented implementation concepts, such as sequencing by (Blair/Srinath 2008), do 
not refer explicitly to such societies. The aspect of governance in such societies of intervention 
has been set as as a unique and not repeated example never before or after in Kosovo, where 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was a peacekeeping 
operation with full authority to act as state authority . Between 1999 and 2001, UNMIK acted as 
a state and not like a state. The history of this Serbian province after 1945 contains an abundance 
of conflicts within society and consequently also in its education systems. Most significant was 
the role of Higher Education in stepping up the conflict, agitating and providing the armed 
insurgency after 1989 with ideological and personal support. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
universities played a significant role under the rule of UNMIK after the intervention of 1999 
as well. However, while this was widely recognized and reported in the policy community,1 re-
markably little systematic research has been pursued on the topic. The first comprehensive and 
sound study in retrospect was published in 2011 (den Boer/van den Borgh 2011); this overview 
does support – briefly – the propositions made above. One of the lessons to be learned from the 
authors is the need of sufficient time to evaluate the history and the stories of Higher Education 
governance under the circumstances of intervention.
Circumstances of intervention produce for a certain period of time a society that is more than 
an addition of elements of both the intervened and the interveners’ societies. This must affect 
governance beyond the question of how far the monopoly of violence is attained by the state; 
normally, statehood in such societies is fragile or limited, but the modes of governance do not 
follow the logical development of statehood. This is, at least partially, due to one of the most 
consequential and least recognized facts of all societies of interventions: the difference between 
those conflicts that are causal for the interventions – “root conflicts” – and those conflicts stemming from 
the intervention itself. More often than not the latter conflicts are interpreted by the interven-
ers in terms of the former, which creates heavy semantic rifts (the semantic aspect of conflict 
theory was a significant segment in the C9 Application of extension (2013) and in Jan Koehler’s 
dissertation of 2013.
We can rely on numerous studies on the effects of interventions on diverse areas of gover-
nance. However, these areas are quite unevenly distributed. Prevailing research concentrates 
on security, the rule of law and economic and infrastructural fields within welfare governance, 
whereas health and – even more so – education, Higher Education – are being rather neglected 
or underrated (Daxner 2003a; Daxner/Schrade 2012). We should consider the reasons for this 
deficiency before analyzing the special case of Afghanistan. Education and Higher Education 
1 Michael Daxner has written and reported widely about both the experience of acting as a key representa-
tive of UNMIK and his reflections on his role as a social scientist. However, his views are certainly biased by 
personal experience and subjective judgment, and – more importantly – by too little distance in time as to 
present conclusive results in both research and policy assessment.  
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sectors are likely to be destroyed by violent conflicts and wars, as they are likely to become re-
constructed slowly and insufficiently by any post-conflict regime. They are slow systems in and 
of themselves, i.e. a large number of actors have the opportunity to interfere with their system-
atic restructuring. Furthermore, less than primary education, Higher Education is not a sector 
where interveners can gain reputation or gratitude from their own constituencies, because any 
success in this area will appear only much later, after the actual interveners are no longer on 
site (the difference is estimated to be between 5 and 15 years). Another problem, and one that 
remains remarkably true for all recent interventions, has been that the education sector was 
never included in negotiations for truce, transitional government, legal improvisation or, pref-
erably, as a key sector for sustainable stability. This lesson has been one of the key tasks of the 
authors with regard to Afghanistan, and it was a major motive for Daxner’s decision to include 
HE in concepts of security and the rule of law, rather than restrict it to development and cul-
tural cooperation. There appear in all cases of societies of intervention two almost self-evident 
(self-explaining) dilemmas:
(1) The interveners’ ideas on education compete with or are incompatible with those of 
the intervened. In many cases (Kosovo, Afghanistan), there is also competition among 
interveners and among the intervened actors on concepts and implementation of 
envisaged changes in the system.
(2) The institutions in the society of intervention have to rely vastly on those teachers, 
curricula, rules of authorization and public opinion that may have been sources of the 
root conflict. Degrees are the representative of authorization, if no binding norms on 
qualification exist. This is an example of symbolic capital becoming effective. 
These dilemmas have an effect on modes, legitimacy and effectiveness of Higher Education 
governance. Since the effects of education can be best measured on the bottom level of society 
(micro-social effects, life-world adherent), we have to consider the movement of Higher Educa-
tion policies on the trajectory of welfare governance from system-level to life-world level.
2. Governance and Higher Education
There is hardly another field in society that is as interconnected with different aspects of gov-
ernance and, yet at the same time, so underrated in its relevance for good governance as Higher 
Education. Higher Education has become the first totally global institution, far ahead of econo-
my and supra-national politics; it has bypassed other institutions, such as family, public admin-
istration or communication in adopting a set of rules and structures that are valid worldwide. 
Alternative options for replacing some of the global features of Higher Education systems have 
so far either failed or resulted in a dramatic loss of effectiveness and quality.
Let us accept this statement without going into the details of its historical and political back-
ground. The worldwide structure of Higher Education has been closely attached to the de-
velopment of European cultural and economic hegemony since the Middle Ages, and is thus 
imperative to colonial, imperialist and post-colonial discourses. Though we may judge the 
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“occidental”2 colour of these discourses, the results of Higher Education are strikingly isomor-
phic; universities and other institutions of tertiary education look alike no matter where they 
may be located, their internal structure is rather uniform and their competitive differentiation 
is rather limited, though functional.
A few mainstream varieties of the academic world, e.g. the German tradition of a unity of teach-
ing and research, the French orientation towards state-borne interests in knowledge produc-
tion and application and the British debate on personality development apart from qualifica-
tion can be found following the days of the great academic reforms following enlightenment 
and nation state building. The remnants of these models can be seen in all post-colonial soci-
eties, according to the respective former colonial powers3. Of course, there are more modeling 
impacts, e.g. from the Soviet Union’s foreign aspirations, or from the United States’ strategy to 
implant their structures wherever they are seeking hegemonial influence. A rather homoge-
neous institutional and structural pattern of operating Higher Education is found in contem-
porary universities, where all these aspects of education become intertwined. This is because 
the globalization of the nexus qualification-employment has become dominant. We see only a 
limited variety of relations between the system of Higher Education and the Science System4 , 
which is equally globalized, although with some different functions regarding the nation-state 
or government5. Regarding Afghanistan, we shall put aside this aspect, as the country does not 
yet possess a significant share in the Science System, i.e. there is no research base at all. Con-
sequently, the impact of authorization and the conveyance of status dominate all functional 
education and qualification functions.
Of course, within these globalized types of institutions, there are some major differences in 
certain respects, especially regarding quality, social equality and the effects on governance. 
2 This corresponds primarily to a discourse started by Max Weber (Weber (2001).  In the course of a 
differentiated politico/linguistic development, the notion of Occidentalism has been often opposed 
to “Orientalism” (Edward Said), but also to a flat and ideological concept of simple “Western culture”. 
There is no equivalent counterpart to “Western” in this discourse, but the politically correct notion is 
frequently “Islamic” values or concepts. 
3 The history of the university has always been torn between historians and sociologists. While there is 
no authoritative single text, the concepts – as described above – are all similar, and they are “European” 
in the sense of “Western” (cf. Weber FN 7). A systematic institutional approach can be found with Bour-
dieu: Bourdieu (1988)
4 Without fully applying Luhmann’s system theory (Luhmann (1997); Luhmann (2002), the distinction 
between the Science System and the System of HE follows his pattern . At least, it works well on the 
level of describing the communication between the two systems that are intertwined; more important 
is the fundamental difference between the two, cf. Zieherm (2010).
5 The independent variable in this case is always the Higher Education system, irrespective of the level 
of research, under the condition that a minimum quality of knowledge base or research potential is 
provided. Authorization and licensing functions belong to the Higher Education system. The science 
system is intervening in Higher Education and provides variance – from Ivy League and other elite 
universities down to almost insignificant knowledge resources beyond common wisdom. The depen-
dent variable is effectiveness, expressed by the “real” capacity of the Higher Education system to place 
the graduates in licensed occupations and to provide them with advantages in gaining social and cul-
tural capital. Only in advanced OECD-countries is the research – i.e. science system – factor is included 
in HE institutions, which creates the imbalance of disadvantaging study against research.
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While quality has a few characteristics that determine acceptable or rejected accreditation to the 
world-wide community of Higher Education, and while the social aspect determines in many 
cases the ability of Higher Education to stabilize or dynamise social strata or classes, the ques-
tion of governance has rarely been in the center of Higher Education policy – except in times of 
revolution or fundamental societal changes.
It would be tempting to discuss the reasons for this deficiency. Higher Education – more con-
cretely, “the University” – belongs to a class of institutions that seem to be partially inaccessible 
to concepts of governance, like sports, the military or the churches. One assumption is that 
this resistance stems from almost anachronistic armor in a “philosophy” specific to the institu-
tion. Of course, Higher Education is different from other institutions in this class; theories of 
Bourdieu still understand the main specifications of Higher Education beyond diverse political 
environments (Bourdieu 1988). Bourdieu also has been the staunchest critic of social progress 
“through” education, while nevertheless accepting the indirect profit individuals and social 
groups can gain through accumulation of social and cultural capitals. Higher Education avoids 
major changes by simply claiming that its philosophy is alien to any reform, which, in the case 
of Afghanistan, is somehow paradoxical, as the Higher Education system became dysfunctional 
a long time ago, but is defended in terms of mature university cultures by many of its members.
When using a rough and simple description of the discourse on governance as it is leading 
research in the SFB 700, we distinguish between the dimension of the rule of Law, the field 
of welfare-governance and the aspect of security. All three dimensions are affected in the per-
manent struggle of Higher Education to remain a Public Good or to change from a Collective 
Good into a Club Good or Private Good. And all these dimensions are under scrutiny when it 
comes to deciding how much state(hood) must be included in the tertiary sector education in 
order to keep it “public”. While this debate is ongoing in the OECD-world under frames such 
as knowledge society, global mobility, life-long learning and standards of excellence, shaky states and 
fragile statehood are facing quite different problems. Apart from chronic underfunding and a 
lack of minimum quality on all levels of required performance, many countries have not found 
a way to integrate their tertiary education into a coherent system of governance. The state is 
needed in these countries on very different levels, with a highly diverse set of abilities. Emerg-
ing economies need a certain solid and stable statehood for licensing degrees and authorizing 
professional applications and the order of professions for the market. Less statehood is needed 
in question of ownership of the respective institution, but then welfare-governance is asked for 
when it comes to tuition fees and the social environment of students and faculty. The problem of 
public and/or private ownership is a typical product of the OECD world, because here univer-
sities compete on a high level of accumulated knowledge, prestige and status attribution. All 
these aspects exist in developing countries as well, but depend, more on the rules that make 
the university attractive to certain social groups, ideological camps (religious or secular), repro-
duction schemes of elites and simple profit expectations, rather than on whether an institute 
is private or state-owned. The state is also needed in many cases when it comes to accreditation, 
international exchange, visas for students and foreign faculty, the social protection and pension plans 
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for faculty, etc. There a few areas, however, where functioning Higher Education without some 
statehood is barely imaginable:
Security as a function of demography, participation in Higher Education and the positioning 
of young generations
• Town and Countryside and “Town and Gown” conflicts
• Status attribution
• Human Rights: gender issues, minority protection and cultural diversification
Most important is the impact of the state on behalf of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy. 
This list that is not self-explanatory; one imagines these issues could be handled separately 
from state and government in developed countries like the U.S. and wealthier Western coun-
tries, where statehood is functionally substituted by professional associations, private founda-
tions and quite a few public-private partnerships. In other parts of the world, there are practi-
cally no examples where non-state governance is able to tackle all these issues in a compre-
hensive way that makes investing in the institution make sense. In other words, only when the 
Deferred Gratification Pattern (cf. FN 5) is applicable is the main focus on students as the core 
of Higher Education likely to remain stable. For a long time, this model (Schneider 1953) has 
been a leading concept for Higher Education reforms; only in the midst of the 1968 unrest was 
it challenged, but even then it did not end up truly being replaced.
The contribution of Higher Education to diverse sectors of good governance will be briefly ex-
plained here along the lines of the short list of categories as listed below
• Security is affected in many ways by Higher Education. Traditionally, one would 
suspect that ideologically and theoretically well-trained students are only a threat to 
stability, such as in situations where rebellions stem from academic unrest or where 
universities are a hatching ground of insurgence6. However, the opposite is also true. 
Educated people aspire to become part of the future elite, to focus on social change 
and to impact ruling discourses. While the threat to security may or may not come 
from inside academia, the acute danger is before and after the status passage of study; 
before, when those who seek admission remain outside and don’t want to stay on the 
waiting list forever, and after, if placement and a timely transition into employment 
disappoints the expectations in the gratification scheme through Higher Education. 
Both groups are susceptible to ideological impregnation, and more open to violent 
6 We see such striking examples in Kosovo between 1989-1999, preceeding the intervention.
Higher Education in Afghanistan  |  14
and abrupt political action, than those inside academia. This is an imminent problem 
in the Afghan situation of transition.7
• The security threat correlates with the importance of status attribution through study 
and an academic degree. In poor societies, an academic degree, especially in a few dis-
tinguished professions (Medicine, Law, Engineering, sometimes Divinity) may be one 
of the few status symbols that can fortify the social status of a family, clan or network. 
It depends on the depth of intrusion into the system whether governance can use the 
Higher Education system as an effective hinge for distributing status along the lines 
of power – or along lines of envisaged social change. There are very few societies whe-
re the teaching professions rise to the top of status hierarchy, though professors and 
members of the top research institutes enjoy high regard.
• “Town and countryside” is an important aspect of national governance. Higher Edu-
cation has an overwhelmingly urban tradition and genealogy. However, if it attempts 
to bring tertiary education to the countryside, this may result in major social changes 
and a rather differentiated development of social strata in remote areas. Thus, the de-
liberate allocation of Higher Education resources to poor rural areas has a significant 
impact on welfare governance at large. “Town and Gown” is the short formula for 
the economic impact of Higher Education. In many cases, universities are tax exempt 
and become wealthy and rich islands in poor environments, which is a substantial 
challenge for good governance on all levels, especially if the university uses its juristic 
and institutional autonomy to allow itself a certain exemption from the local rule of 
law. The relationship between Higher Education and the community is often a rather 
underdeveloped field of governance. This refers to the conflicts between academic 
habitus and local attitudes as well. 
• There are quite a few relevant intervening variables in good governance, such as gen-
der democracy, minority protection and cultural diversification. These are never ac-
cidental when it comes to Higher Education planning and policy. When these aspects 
are ignored or underappreciated, they may develop into major sources of conflict. In 
most cases, it is the state that imposes rules that are more sensitive towards the spe-
cific constituencies of high-aiming values (gender equality, inclusiveness, diversity), 
while the institutional powers tend towards a more conservative defense of the status 
quo. Academic unrest is often a forerunner to broader social movements on such 
issues.
• The most important role of the state, apart from licensing and authorizing, is the 
protection of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. We do not know of any 
sustainable system of Higher Education in which these principles are not protected 
either by the constitution or special legislation. At the same time, the state regularly 
endangers the same principles by intervening whenever its power of defining dis-
courses and policies is challenged by academia; thus universities often defend their 
7 Cf. Daxner/Schrade (2012). This was the original motivation to approach the Foreign Office. In the Report of 
2011, the Foreign Office reserves just a few lines for the problem: Bundesregierung (2010), 63f.
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privileges against those instances that are meant to protect them. This plays an enor-
mous role in constructing a cross-system governance that is functional for all three 
sectors, i.e. scientific (scholarly),professional (educational), and economical (labour 
market). If you deliver into one sector, how can you safeguard the stability of the other 
two? It is noteworthy that such an interplay does not occur when there is no state in-
terference; in this case, academic freedom is a mere function of effectiveness, i.e. it is 
granted if it promotes the outcome of research and training without giving away too 
many effects to competitors or an uncontrolled public.
• We should add two rather important sectors that influence governance on all levels. 
One is the pivotal role of Higher Education in teacher training for all levels of 
elementary and secondary education. With this massive constituency one can reach 
a good part of any nation, reaching meaning educating, influencing, manipulating; 
it means shaping mindsets and convictions, critical abilities and affirmative 
complacency among the direct contact persons, not only for the younger generation, 
but for their parents and peers as well. Secondly, the agency training and education 
of school teachers has a hand in the (relatively speaking) largest civilian workforce 
of any developing system. This has an indirect impact on all kinds of governance, 
from labour relations to competition over payment with security forces and civil 
administration. 
This is only a very brief introduction into a field that has been regularly marginalized in con-
flict areas, and especially in governments set up as a consequence of (military, humanitarian) 
interventions.
3. Higher Education in the Society of Intervention
All of this applies to Afghanistan, as it would to any country with a tertiary sector. There are 
quite a few direct and indirect links to the research we are doing in C9, which is focused on 
villages and districts in North East Afghanistan. Education is an important category and indi-
cator for certain analyses of local networks; interface with professional training always allows 
insights into the changes in social stratification and differentiation. The security aspect is obvi-
ous, if there is correlation between the origin of high school graduates and their later attempts 
to get admitted to Higher Education. In order to understand the present situation in Afghani-
stan, we should distinguish between the expected function of the tertiary sector (i.e. universities 
and post-secondary education) and the conditions under which such systems can function in a 
society of intervention and conflict.
However, let us try to cover some basics first before we investigate this situation (which is simi-
lar in other societies of intervention) further. From “universities”8 we expect the delivering of 
scientific and analytical support of government and the provision of expertise to political and 
8 The title “university” in place of college, polytechnic, institute etc. is eagerly sought by the institutions, 
in order to gain reputation with students and their parents, and thus, indirectly, with the social envi-
ronments of graduates. On the ethno-linguistic quarrels about naming universities see Rzehak (2012).
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cultural peers (it is as yet unclear if foreign interveners are also addressees of the services by Af-
ghan universities). The function of formation (“Bildung”) is not regarded as highly important in 
reality, as the context of class and status is not traditionally linked to the Western type of social 
and cultural capital. Universities influence the future texture of culture through teacher educa-
tion and professional retraining. In Afghanistan this is even more important than elsewhere 
because the reconstruction of the school sector has by far overtaken the development of Higher 
Education. Universities can only succeed when assuring international and inter-institutional 
communication in a field that is already globalized and does not depend excessively on national 
particularities; however, developing critical capacities and a communicative spirit among the 
young generation is a very specific local and national endeavour. In societies under reconstruc-
tion, universities should help create a strong status group across social strata and a democratic 
elite for future leadership and public office. This is related to the aim of strengthening state-
hood by serving as a distributor of titles, authorization, professional licensing and formal aug-
ments to status and reputation.
This list is certainly not exhaustive. Before we turn to the special case of Afghanistan, we have 
to recognize a few conditions set by institutional history and tradition and by globalization. 
The tension between state and statehood on the one side and local governance on the other is 
significant in the education sector. This is the case in Higher Education; it also implicates the 
strained relations between central government and local governance and the relation between 
cities and towns on the one side, and villages and remote rural areas on the other. Only recently, 
i.e. after 2009, has there been a vague effort to increase the availability of Higher Education in 
the countryside, mainly by building institutes of Higher Education in some provinces, and 
by licensing new universities, which often contain only faculties of education and agriculture. 
Most of these institutions are just blueprints; in any case, it is too early to predict whether they 
are sustainable.
3.1 Global, European and Local Universities
Afghanistan has never prominently sought close connections with the international commu-
nity of higher learning (other than in the field of general education, where the government of 
Amanullah Khan (1917-1929) led the ground for a certain catch-up with modernity – but this is 
in the very distant past) (Barfield 2012: 164pp.; Ruttig/al. 2011). The Soviet intervention, as a spin-
off, fostered direct contact with a highly elaborate and functional system of Higher Education. 
Since then, Afghanistan’s tertiary sector has entered a road of no return: academic standards, 
hierarchies, rewards and degrees and, most importantly, a certain mode of governance, have 
deeply influenced all of Afghan Higher Education – till today. The Djihad, the Mujaheddeen, 
the Taliban could not extinguish this influence, but the system eroded and became diffuse. 
When the Western intervention began to gain influence on welfare governance, primary edu-
cation received priority, while Higher Education remained in the background (cf. Daxner and 
Schrade 2012). However, it was clear to all universities and the respective ministries (Higher 
Education, and for parts of teacher training, Education) that a re-integration into the regional 
(i.e. South Asian) and global communities of Higher Education was desirable for the new sys-
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tem. Only recent nationalistic ideologies and a strong value threat have created a less favorable 
climate for that endeavor. Several of the major donor countries, with the U.S. at the helm, and 
Germany still playing an important role, try to support reforms in direction of this integration, 
but have increasingly become ineffective through a misguided idea of Afghan ownership (see 
later: page 30).
In order to not become denounced as post-colonial advocates of global (=Western) ideas of Higher 
Education, let us take a short look at this field. We speak of global universities when considering 
the numerous strong networks of institutions, i.e. rules and procedures that structure all tertiary 
institutions of some reputation. While in former periods universities were central to nations’ 
self-esteem, today the transnational element of a global academic structure prevails. This creates 
substantial tension as the process of globalization meets post-colonial and neo-nationalist resis-
tance, especially when it comes to the function of universities serving a national ideology. This 
aspect is important for several reasons: Afghanistan must internationalize its universities within 
the global system in order to establish the necessary contacts in research and study. But inter-
national contacts are always political: e.g. joining the South-Asian Rectors Conference has other 
implications than looking for a European or East Asian option. Among donors there is a certain 
competition for afghan affiliations: if afghan universities accept aid or money they should be 
inclined to take over elements from the donor’s system of Higher Education.
Higher Education as we know it today exhibits an explicit European structure and appearance, 
and will lose it by becoming globalized and transnational. The universities have older roots; 
in the strict sense their origin is in the Golden Age of Islam in the 8th – 10th centuries and the 
Almohavid Empire in Spain in the 11th century, but their lasting significant characteristic uni-
versities received in Bologna and Paris in the 12th century. The Bologna and Paris models have 
formed our image of universities till today: the ideal unity between scholars and students, the 
high level of internal participation, the principles of academic freedom, and many functions 
had been established at this early stage. The functions slowly changed according to the devel-
opment of European societies; the separation of faith and science, the rising of the middle 
classes, the differentiation in qualification needs, the diversification of knowledge and classifi-
cation etc. all played a role in this process. Colonialism and the making of the nation state were 
perhaps the most influential re-adjustments in the structure of universities, and they explain 
why, beyond any reasoning, the worldwide features of Higher Education are “European”9. The 
European structure of the university is expressed through its organization of faculty and the 
arrangement of subjects, by its teaching routines and its basic educational endeavour and by its 
permanent struggle for academic freedom and autonomy. This struggle has not ended in any 
Higher Education system and is in fact global today, as is the network of Higher Education. 
With regard to globalization, Higher Education is a forerunner. Standards, rating and rank-
ing, trans-disciplinary exchange and communication have overcome national concerns. The 
transnational organization of Higher Education is like an anticipation of a world culture; in 
9 We do not automatically equate “European” with “Western”.  We shall refer back to this later in our 
argument. 
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any case it is trans-national.10. This is an overall positive and peaceful outlook on Higher Edu-
cation. However, there are many deficiencies, dangers and risks that darken this bright picture. 
Some of the main reasons for a multi-cause discontent with universities and Higher Education 
can be found in the antagonistic view of particular interests and in general misunderstand-
ings about the functions of Higher Education. Business has a narrow view, focused on appli-
cable skills; the government has a narrow view and wants scholars to comply with national and 
ideological imperatives; industrial lobbies want to exploit research results while not paying for 
them, etc. Democratic systems and good governance in Higher Education can cope with these 
antagonisms, but never can erase them totally; systems with poor governance and less expert 
Higher Education policies have more problems. Malfunctions of Higher Education are caused 
by continuous under-financing, which occurs for various reasons. One of them is that business 
often thinks Higher Education needs more free market and the power to create its own income. 
Higher Education is not a business, even if some of its parts operate like businesses. This also 
leads to attacks from business and industry about the poor qualifications of graduates, which 
may be true in many cases. On the other hand we find the discontent exhibited by many experts 
and students to be because of their inappropriate positioning in the spectrum of disciplines. 
Another area of deficiencies lies in the conflicts between students and the owners of universi-
ties about the students’ social status, tuition fees, study conditions, teaching quality and campus 
restrictions. There are struggles of faculty over salaries, working conditions, promotion and 
recognition. And, last but not least, there is the conflict between “town and gown”.
Everybody in Higher Education will immediately recognize these types of deficiencies and con-
flicts and refer to the many successful or failed attempts to reform the system. Permanent reform 
is a significant ingredient of Higher Education, everywhere and at any time. The delivery of collective 
public goods under the permanent stress of change is a big challenge to welfare governance. 
This is a similar phenomenon to those observed on the local level in those communities, which 
must be open to adaptive change in order to maintain their social order. Higher Education is, 
despite its need for permanent reform, “conservative”. Its credibility is based upon a long-term 
stability of its structure. But there are other conflicts that come from a deeper layer of social 
problems; universities tend to be seismographs of political instability. Many protest movements 
world-wide have their origin in the university, and they are feared by those in power, the per-
ception depending on the frontlines between rule and discontent. Dictatorships tend to shut 
down universities or to marginalize them, until the rulers realize that their national economy 
and the expertise needed for ruling suffer equally from the suppression of academic freedom 
and the curtailing of quality. A fully developed dictatorship would be required to significantly 
damage Higher Education. Restraints on curriculum for religious or ideological reasons, bu-
reaucracy, corruption at admission, exams and graduation, discrimination of specific groups, 
etc. are other ways of disciplining academia. All of this is why Higher Education is permanently 
under political scrutiny.
10 It would be rewarding to link this aspect to John W. Meyer’s outlook on a world-society that combines 
democracy and progress while simultaneously individualizing human rights (cf. Meyer 2005).
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We want to add some more signifiers to all institutions of Higher Education. It is necessary 
to list them because, very often, as in the Afghan case, planning reduces the institution to its 
merely functional core, with little consideration for the social and political impact of each re-
form. First of all, universities are slow systems – “slow” implies here that rituals, traditions and 
symbols change slower than social dynamics in the environment, and it also means that time 
between decisions taken within the university and between the institution and the state or a 
partner take a long time, especially when it comes to appointments of faculty or changes in the 
curriculum. Another characteristic of Higher Education is that it plays an integral role in the 
power games in a society, including the symbolic representation of values, ideas, ideologies and 
trends. Terminologies and ideas are formulated, if not always created, in Higher Education. 
Universities demand continuous care of their properties, such as academic freedom and insti-
tutional autonomy; this implicates the demand for recognizing their authority in defining the 
interface between laypersons and experts cultures, as no ministry or board can regulate all of 
these domains. This claim of the universities certainly has no deep roots in most post-colonial 
Higher Education systems and is indeed one of the more dangerous trigger points in relations 
between the state and the universities. That is one reason why private Higher Education is 
mushrooming even more pronouncedly in post-colonial societies than in developed capitalist 
societies11. Most private institutions on the tertiary level operate on the rather unpretentious 
level of mere training, thus avoiding any controversy about competing ideas and academic free-
dom; these are critical to the RoL aspect of Higher Education. Good governance is challenged 
by the private institutions because they are dealing exclusively with club goods, and their inten-
tion is to get their delivery recognized as “public” through the recognition of the institution’s 
titles. In countries with limited statehood and badly functioning administration, this claim 
falls prey to either corruption or devaluation of titles. Both are equally detrimental for good 
governance. We also see an interface with Higher Education and its role in education and the 
formation of mature, critical personalities and mindsets. Over the centuries, it has been less the 
normative impact of this role, but rather its practical outcome that has allowed for the survival 
of the universities. Moral and intellectual roles cannot be replaced by standards of efficiency 
and quick impact, imagining a free market for trained competences. Since Higher Education 
delivers its products over the long term only, the outcome of each single reform is difficult to 
measure. Politics and idealistic programs as well as the claims from the science system want 
Higher Education to be part of the public space and to translate science into comprehensible 
orientation and knowledge for lay persons. The credibility of Higher Education depends on its 
capacity to identify problems and to offer solutions, which includes “criticism of reality”. The 
university demands respect and recognition of its expertise and its authority does not like to 
be challenged by popular ideologies. Finally, universities compete with each other, for students, 
reputed professors, research contracts and impact on diverse markets. Yet, there is also the soli-
darity of all members of Higher Education to shield their institutions from undue influence 
by particular groups, from misdemeanor and from corruption (reality is clearly different from 
this concept, and less resplendent; however, the modes of legitimacy more often than not rely 
on this idealistic frame). 
11 Cf. www.mohe.gov.af/?lang=en&p=private. Retrieved 2013-04-22. One example out of many: Royee (2011).
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This is a quite normative framework. It is accepted and propagated by the majority of Higher 
Education associations and advocacies worldwide, such as UNESCO, IAU (the International As-
sociation of Universities), regional Rectors Conferences such as the SARC (South Asian Rectors 
Conference) and by many disciplinary and professional associations. Therefore, it is essential 
for any Higher Education system to be part of this transnational network. With regard to aca-
demic freedom and the ethical core of Higher Education, organizations like the Magna Charta 
Observatory12 are strong guardians of principles that must be defended permanently.
It is obvious that these high standards and demanding norms are being challenged from di-
verse sides. We will not engage in general considerations on how to face them here, but rather 
concentrate on concrete and detailed circumstances of a system of Higher Education, in our 
case for Afghanistan. It is this case that will allow us to describe the security dimension of gov-
ernance.
3.2 Afghanistan
Let us shift attention now to the Afghan case. Before coming to the analytical part, we shall lay 
out some basic facts on the current state of Higher Education in Afghanistan. This will provide 
a sound base from which to map the role that Higher Education plays in the current state build-
ing process and to portray the links to different areas of governance.
In Afghanistan, a population of at least 28 million lives on a territory of more than 600.000 
km². School attendance increased from 2,3 million to 8,6 million between 2003 and 2011. Public 
universities and institutes of Higher Education host ca. 100.000 students, and their cumulated 
admission capacity is ca. 40.000. The waiting list of students who are seeking admission is 
160.000 in 2012 and likely to rise to 500.000 by 2014. The prognosticated increase of capacity in 
public Higher Education is 15% p.a., while the budget increase in the long run shall be 5% gross, 
i.e. with adjustment for inflation. The data for private Higher Education are volatile, but a con-
servative estimate counts ca. 200 establishments of private tertiary establishments, of which not 
more than 10-15 can be regarded as serious institutions of higher learning. Since private educa-
tion is free to charge high tuition fees, little quality is sold for maximum profit. Apart from the 
American University (AUAF) and very few followers, private Higher Education does not seem 
capable of bridging the gap between state governed and private governance in delivering basic 
needs for the sector; however, in terms of the major aspects of status distribution by admission, 
private education and Higher Education may get strong impact from private actors, especially 
in delivering symbolic capital for the status aspiration of the new middle classes.
12 The Observatory of the Magna Charta Universitatum is an advocate for academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy set up in Bologna in 1988 at the 900th anniversary of the founding of Europe’s oldest university. It 
monitors the status of academic freedom in diverse systems. Former Minister Fayez (2001-2005) was a strong 
supporter of the Observatory and made a remarkable contribution in 2007 at the anniversary celebration. 
Fayez (2008).
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Table 2: Public Higher Education13
No. Name of Educational Institution
(incl. official website) 
No. Students No. Academic Staff
1 Albiruni University Gulbahar
(http://au.edu.af/en)
1643 70
2 Balkh University Mazar-e-Sharif
(http://ba.edu.af/en)
5781 259
3 Bamyan University
(http://bu.edu.af/en)
616 64
4 Herat University
(http://hu.edu.af/en)
5285 247
5 Kabul University
(http://ku.edu.af/en)
13350 541
6 Kabul Education University
(http://keu.edu.af/en)
5500 184
7 Kabul Polytechnic University
(http://kpu.edu.af/en)
2536 173
8 Kabul Medical University
(http://kmu.edu.af/en)
1736 248
9 Kandahar University
(http://kan.edu.af/en)
2850 162
10 Khost University
(http://szu.edu.af/en)
3000 132
11 Nangarhar University Jalalabad
(http://nu.edu.af/en)
8020 335
12 Paktia University
(http://pu.edu.af/en)
3000 46
13 Takhar University
(http://tu.edu.af/en)
1572 51
14 Baghlan Higher Education Institute
(http://baghlan.edu.af/en)
1348 47
13 Sources: MoHE: Strategic Plan (2009); homepages of universities; project research by Michael Daxner 
and Urs Schrade. Spelling has been slightly homogenized. A few universities have been officially 
founded in the meantime, but either are not yet operational (“Paper Universities”) or represent a non-
academic status of performance. Politically, this is an extremely touchy point; many students who did 
not receive admission to better reputed colleges are outsourced to the regional teacher colleges and 
paper universities. Thus, the quantitative outlook does not look that grim, but even with all students 
in minor colleges, the numbers are much too low as to deliver relief to the situation described.
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No. Name of Educational Institution
(incl. official website) 
No. Students No. Academic Staff
15 Kundoz Higher Education Institute
(http://kundoz.edu.af/en)
1139 30
16 Faryab Higher Education Institute
(http://faryab.edu.af/en)
1214 42
17 Ghazni Higher Education Institute
(http://gu.edu.af/en)
368 16
18 Badakhshan Higher Education Institute
(http://badakhshan.edu.af/en)
385 25
19 Parwan Higher Education Institute
(http://parwan.edu.af/en)
1237 43
The history of Afghan Higher Education is not considered typical for Central Asia. Pakistan 
has a typical post-colonial system with many elements of British academia; Iran has a long 
academic tradition, although only under the Pahlevis in the 1950s did a massive modernization 
and stratification of national Higher Education begin, and democracy and human rights still 
have not caught up with development. Afghanistan went through long periods of indirect rule 
after serious violent conflicts with the British Empire; later on, after 1919, the making of a new 
state developed some particular features. While the northern neighbors came under Soviet rule 
rather early (after 1924), Afghanistan underwent a short period of massive top down moderniza-
tion under King Amanullah Shah (1917-1929). The King focused on schools and other areas of 
public emancipation. Kabul University opened for classes in 1932, only after the King’s demise. 
It was a reputed college in the region and for the region. Especially in the 1960s, it became a cen-
tre of education for the intellectual elite who were to rule the country only a decade later. Herat 
University was founded only in 1988, and it underwent a most remarkable reconstruction after 
2001 to become an intellectual centre in a modern environment. Nangarhar got a university in 
1963. The same year, Kabul Polytechnic opened its doors. It was meant to be a college that would 
follow the rules of the first wave of internationalization. It is now the second largest university 
in the country. Kandahar University was founded by the post-Soviet government of President 
Najibullah in 1990. Balkh University in Mazar-e-Sharif was founded during the occupation in 
1986. There are some more public universities and teacher education colleges as well:
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Table 3: Founding dates and number of faculties of public universities14
No. Name of University Year Established No. Faculties
1 Albiruni University 2000 6
2 Balkh University 1986 9
3 Bamyaan University  1996 2
4 Herat University  1988 11
5 Kabul University  1932 14
6 Kabul Education University 2003 6
7 Kabul Poly Technique University 1969 5
8 Kabul Medical University 1932 4
9 Kandahar University 1990 6
10 Khost University 2000 9
11 Nangarhar University 1964 9
12 Paktia University 2004 5
13 Takhar University 1995 n.a.
In any case, before the Soviet occupation, Afghan Higher Education was a phenomenon of a 
certain urban seclusion, aiming at a small elite; competition between the major Afghan univer-
sities and the trend of the upper classes sending their children to neighboring countries or to 
reputed universities in the West still occurs today. It is of little importance to seek continuities 
and ruptures in this system over the last 40 years. A 30 year war and a complex post-war period 
of intervention and post-intervention conflicts certainly mark a new period. This does not mean 
that there are no leftovers from earlier periods and that there are no real or imagined traditions 
from certain periods of the war, e.g. from the Soviet occupation, or the time of the Jihad. The 
Soviet tradition is not as short-lived as any other in recent history. The Soviet intervention itself 
also created and left first traditions, as has the new Afghan state. After 2001, the Afghan system 
of Higher Education was shaped by three groups of experts, all of them speaking in the context 
of the intervention and the new government. One group consisted of Afghan returnees, who 
brought with them their experience with foreign Higher Education; another group was made 
up of their peers from within existing institutions, including rectors, deans, distinguished aca-
demic teachers and students; the third group consisted of a rather incoherent mix of foreign 
Higher Education specialists, monetary and other material development cooperation experts, 
business, and the massesof academic exchange activists. While the first two groups consisted 
mainly of individuals, the third group was a mixture of individual and institutional actors. 
This created very significant problems (Altbach 2012). While elementary education was high on 
14 Source: MoHE and websites of institutions Cf. Table 2.
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the list of international actors, both donors and advisors, Higher Education was much less so. 
In principle, the task to reconstruct and enlarge a system of Higher Education seemed to be 
relatively easy, if costly, but compared to elementary and vocational education, it did not look 
like an impossible task to rescue the system. Germany was the unofficial lead nation for Higher 
Education15. Our account of Afghan Higher Education does not follow a detailed chronology, 
which has already been documented quite meticulously. It is neither an assessment from the 
point of view of Higher Education evaluators nor from consultants. The results from efforts 
to support Afghan Higher Education can be found in several comprehensive Master Plans and 
programs.
Table 4: Important planning documents for Afghan Higher Education16
Planning Document Year
Ministry of Higher Education: National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2009
Ministry of Higher Education: Planning Process 2009
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008
Mousavi, Dr. Sayed Askar: Ministry of Higher Education Strategic Development Plan 2006
UNESCO: Ministry of Higher Education Strategic Development Plan 2005
Ministry of Higher Education: Strategic Action Plan 2004
We try to present here a meta-analysis from the view of the present with strong attention to the 
political context and the position of Higher Education in a broader social and cultural environ-
ment. Despite the fact that many planning documents (“strategic papers”) seem to be perfectly 
rational, they don’t show much attachment to the reality both of people and of changing social 
and political structures. Meta-analysis simply means that we observed the environment of the 
Higher Education system, looking for interfaces, antagonisms and unexpected options. It is 
contextualization that is underdeveloped in most plans. The present is the beginning period of 
transition. Our assumption is that the role of Higher Education will be more important for the 
transition period than before and that it will be decisive for four areas of the country’s develop-
ment, and universities and other institutions of Higher Education will be equally important for 
four areas of public interest and governance.
• First of all, Higher Education will be needed for public education and the creation of 
a mindset for the new democratic elite. This is important for Afghanistan, as the old 
15 (This is where “I” (Michael Daxner) and another “we” (i.e. the team, the Ministry of Higher Education, 
where I had the privilege to serve as an international advisor, and some team-members) come into 
the picture, no longer as specialists in Higher Education policy, but as active practitioners in Higher 
Education reforms in Afghanistan.
16 The first comprehensive legislation (Draft) is attached to The Action Plan of 2004. For the most re-
cent version see www.mohe.gov.af/?lang=en&p=plan. Retrieved 2013.04.22. Cf. also (Hayward 2012; Ko-
histani 2011).
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elites are becoming increasingly obsolete and will not meet both the democratic and 
the functional requirements of a society that, in its majority, consists of people under 
twenty. On the other side, a rivalry with a military elite is unlikely for the time being, 
because the ANA (Afghan National Army) is currently still under construction, and 
commanders from the wars have increasingly lost both reputation and actual influ-
ence. We do not know what will happen if some of these commanders come back, as 
is a recent development.17  
• Equally important is the function of serving economic development, especially the la-
bor market and the progress of research-based development. The very narrow hierar-
chy of disciplinary fields and professional areas of qualification has already created a 
shortage in many sectors; the booming business administration and IT segments are 
not representative for the disciplinary priorities needed.
• Another function that is often neglected by Higher Education insiders is the effect of 
Higher Education on the social adaptation of new stratification and differentiation 
processes. There is a new middle class emerging for whom the status of having their 
children in college is more important and differentiated than in the past, but it is 
also less easy to send these children abroad now. Status distribution through Higher 
Education is an important peace-building element.
• This is linked to a fourth and sensitive issue: Higher Education can improve security 
with regard to reducing the risk of alienating youth and driving them towards vio-
lent and extremist views. This last aspect is heavily discussed amongst experts in the 
intervening countries; many of the politicians fear an academic proletariat that will 
become more extreme and less easy to integrate into the new society, a society that 
will have more students enrolled in Higher Education. We hold that the opposite is 
more likely, i.e. high school graduates left on the waiting lists, unable to get through 
the doors of academia, are in fact the greater danger.
These four areas are partially interdependent. They have not been in the focus of international 
development work in Afghanistan because of deficits in comprehensive state-building and in 
connecting Higher Education to other societal processes, e.g. creating visible sectors of suc-
cessful placement of donor money. There are many reasons for this multi-dimensional deficit:
The reforms planned during the Golden Hour18 after 2001 were abruptly stopped shortly before 
the elections of 2004/5. Achievements up until that point, such as the Rectors Conference and 
the draft legislation for Higher Education, stagnated or were withdrawn. At the same time, the 
reconstruction of elementary and secondary (=high) school system and primary school teacher 
17 In our project C9 (cf. www.sfb-governance.de/C9) we do longitudinal studies in North-East Afghanistan. 
Some of our recent findings give importance to the question of returned commanders, but the answers 
will have wait until further analyses of data. 
18 Golden Hour is the technical term for the period of time between ceasefire or the termination of 
hostilities and the first signs of disappointment by the local population.  The real Golden Hour is not 
a homogeneous period of time, but also a construct of perception.
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education were given so much attention and priority that Higher Education fell behind. This 
led to a sharp increase of graduates from primary and secondary schools, often communicated 
as one of the major success stories of reconstruction. 
Higher Education has not been subject to comprehensive assessment in a way that would allow 
for the drafting of a plan for diversified institutional profiles with quantitative and qualitative 
specifications. The Universities of Kabul, Kabul Polytechnic, Kabul University of Education, 
Kabul Medical University, Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar and Kandahar are certainly in a different 
league when compared to the rest of institutions. Upcoming universities, like Khost, are 
given too little attention, while some teacher training colleges and the medical faculties are 
special cases. The capacity for absorbing more admitted students has not been substantially 
enlarged in public universities, while the quality of private institutions has never been assured 
(exception: AUAF (American University of Afghanistan), which is very expensive and certainly an 
elite institution). The relationships between the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry 
of Higher Education (MoHE) have never been well coordinated. The former profited from vast 
investment by international donors with quick impact outcome; the latter suffered from the 
immobility of the Higher Education system after Minister Fayez’ resignation in 2005 and the 
low profile of reforms thereafter. Only recently, say, after 2009, has the MoHE begun to recover 
from these deficits. Today, there is more openness towards addressing the problems listed above, 
especially from the new Minister Obaidullah (since 2012) and Deputy Ministers. However, the 
system in and of itself is neither stable nor integrated in the dynamism of social change and 
development, as would be needed in the period of transition up through 2014 and beyond. The 
underlying program of good governance to deliver the public good of Higher Education and 
to place it appropriately in all three sectors has never been elaborated on or developed further.
4. Governance
The circumstances of our research and conclusions should be described before we arrive at the 
core of our considerations. Our main sources of information have been observation, dialogue 
with representatives of the Higher Education system and rather fragmented participation in a 
reform debate, both at political (centralized) and institutional (decentralized) levels. The study 
of written sources and other research has had some importance, but did not help us much to 
gain new insights. With regard to governance, some very typical and significant literature was 
necessary; such as (Nixon 2007; Stapleton 2012), while other, more policy-oriented studies be-
long to a broader framework. Much of our knowledge is based on inductive proceedings and a 
complex labor of translating contexts and interpreting statements, deeply involved in critical 
semantics.
We want to translate the description of the system in terms of governance. What content of 
delivery do the people expect under what circumstances, and what kind of delivery would be 
appropriate?
We may assume that some expectations can be more easily proven than others. However, all of 
them have a strong empirical background that is less taken from Higher Education itself, but 
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rather from studies on Afghan society. The following list is ordered according to a hypothetical 
ranking of relevance; this may be modified by more empirical insights in some cases:
• Most people expect education and Higher Education to remain “public”, i.e. admis-
sion and enrolment are guaranteed by the state and degrees remain an authorized 
domain of the state.The state is also a good shelter for semi-autonomous academic 
patronage and external patronage, using Higher Education as a safe haven for acti-
vities (not only corruption, but also political organization and ideological/religious 
infiltration).
• The Deferred Gratification Pattern shall be continued and modified in such a way as 
that the degree serves changed expectations, especially those of the growing middle 
classes.
• This will require a massive shift in the labor market towards those professions that 
depend on a certain qualification and less on a position in civil service or in the 
symbolic hierarchies of the elite. This does not apply, however, to those lower strata 
whose members will not enjoy the benefits and gratifications from Higher Education, 
but will depend more on social welfare and a protection of their primary reproduc-
tion; nor will it apply to the top percentile, who will continue sending their children 
to study abroad or save them important positions irrespective of their qualification in 
certain fields. We may call this class the patrons, i.e. those running powerful patrona-
ge networks.
• People in the countryside and in rural or remote areas expect that a minimum deli-
very occurs in terms of female teacher training and some other professions aiming 
at females. The chance to foster female education can be combined with the chance 
to keep the graduates within the local or regional catchment of the training location. 
Male adolescents may seek the same programs and graduate from teacher training 
colleges, but they do not intend on becoming practicing teachers. They will instead 
use the title as a status distinction and migrate to the cities, where they are likely to 
earn more.
• Good governance would also care that all establishments of Higher Education deve-
lop a certain degree of economic spin-off, thus serving the local economy.
These expectations from good governance are simply plausible; the empirical data are inad-
equate as to serve as a compact foundation. However, we hold that they can be relatively easily 
proven, not least by the explicit statements by representatives of the system, both in power or 
oppressed.
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 Other expectations are more difficult to meet:
The impact of tertiary education will change local habits, which will also cause changes in the 
modes and intensity of social control. It is very likely that any level of quality education, but 
especially Higher Education, will create some knowledge and behavior that may bring increas-
ing frictions between parents and children, between peers and self-conscious students and be-
tween traditional and modernized patterns of behaviour and judgment. In other words: people 
know that Higher Education will bring social change, but are not at all certain in which way 
this change should or will change social control (the idea of changing patterns of belief and 
behaviour through school can be widely studied in late colonial and post-colonial literature, 
one prominent example being Kim by Rudyard Kipling, where the boy is taken as an example of 
this change and shifts from personal supervision to the “system” through a kind of unavoidable 
education).
• Another aspect of good governance in all education and Higher Education is the ex-
pectation that the relatively large and compact workforce will become a loyal party of 
dedicated civil servants and thus part of governance itself. Ideally, these teachers and 
academic lecturers will become multipliers of the norms and principles that are gui-
ding governance, and thus act as another formative executive of social control other 
than parents. While this is true in general, there are many diverting forces that may 
accumulate to a reverse effect. Religious indoctrination may deviate from state-orien-
tation; teachers, as a less respected group of civil servants, may adapt to the local rules 
of social control and act with counter-emancipatory impact; as intellectuals of sort 
they may be susceptible to radical or sometimes extremist views, because their recog-
nition within the social system is not rewarding; being low paid, they may also divert 
their capacity to private side-jobs that can be counter-productive to their educational 
duties, or they could even become criminal or entangled in patronage bondage. The 
quality of teaching is representative for the overall respect and recognition that gover-
nance will receive by the people.
• Promotion and assignment to certain positions within the education system is part of 
normal patronage and insufficient governance within this system. This is the paradig-
matic field of governance broken down from the highest system level into the imme-
diate life-world of individuals and local families and communities.
Example 1:
Under the pretext of the strictly legal meritocratic selection of students, a 
traditional exercise of testing high-school graduates has been applied, the Konkor. 
The procedures of this test are almost incomprehensible and were originally 
designed for a very small number of applicants; today, the number is ca. 650% of 
available admissions, irrespective of the distribution among certain disciplines. 
The Konkor is like a rated breaking point of the system. No one pretends this 
system is free from corruption. This refers to the technical performance of this 
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test – similar to the SAT, as favored by Prof. Hamidzai, former Rector of Nangarhar 
University and an important advisor to MoHE. (Hamidzai is influential insofar 
as he has been a Maryland, U.S., public employee and is a very knowledgeable 
expert in public employment. He is currently chancellor of Kabul Education 
University). The real destructive force is created by the contortion of the results; 
students are individually graded and assigned to certain study programs and to 
certain institutions. Immediately after the release of the results from Konkor, a 
most remarkable spectacle begins. Literally hundreds or thousands of admitted 
students – and many among those who failed the test – show up at the MoHE to try 
to change or correct their results. One bizarre example was a student from Nimruz 
who wanted to do Medicine in Kabul and was assigned to another program (art 
history) in his home province. Of course, corrections are costly, and not only in 
a financial sense; if a student requires his family’s ties to patronage and political 
protection, the RoL layer of the system is challenged more than the welfare level. 
And of course, the ruling elite, the urban elites and the regional/local elites and 
their respective networks protect the process as long as it serves their status.
While all the listed aspects of poor governance apply to the entire system of education, Higher 
Education is affected in particular because good governance concentrates by priority on teacher 
education; only if school teachers are significantly better educated than their clientele and their 
clientele’s parents will they enjoy authority and thus attain certain positions in local communi-
ties, notably at the level of informal institutions. The producers of such good teachers will enjoy 
even higher reputations and may be rewarded by higher ranks in the informal hierarchy of local 
honor and recognition. To attain such noble aims takes time and money and an explicit strat-
egy which is barely perceptible at the moment. If this stark assumption is plausible enough, we 
must insist that there are no valid empirical studies covering the entire field and supporting 
all aspects of it. Nevertheless, we can base the assumption on a series of empirical studies with 
relative significance and reliability, as well as on some policy papers related to the assumption. 
Policy papers often rely on surveys that measure anything but governance and effectiveness in 
education and are therefore of little help for our considerations (cf. surveys of ARD, Asia Foun-
dation 2004-2012, AREU , e.g., (Hunte 2006), etc.. On the other hand, many targeted reports on 
education and Higher Education miss the broader context, e.g. (DAAD 2010). One of the most 
reliable sources is the continuous coverage by Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), (i.a. Bijlert, 
Giustozzi, Ruttig).
Without an analysis of the complex situation, no new programs can or should be developed. 
The early reforms were either appreciated by the academic peers and any politicians in 2003-
5, or there was at least a debate about coping with the situation in order to instigate reforms. 
Examples for the first situation are the opening up towards the international community of 
higher education, partnerships with other universities, disciplinary and subject-oriented ex-
change and projects and institutionalized relations between the rectors/chancellors and the 
state (MoHE). Examples for the second field of reforms were the entire question of tuition fees 
and student social situation, the problem of entry qualification and upgrading of academic 
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staff and the problem of corruption in admission and examinations. On the policy level, we 
can attribute much of this reform stagnation to both the incoherent coordination among the 
international agents and the “ungoverned government and administration”, a term that was 
coined by me after studying the attempts to make the administration of MoHE more efficient 
without using the unfeasible recommendations of consultants for creating a lean bureaucracy. 
The negative synergy between the two causes for failure proved (and is still proving) fatal.
Many political leaders among the Afghans and the international community likewise had no 
understanding of the importance of Higher Education for both the peace-building process and 
the backbone reforms a country would need for secure infrastructure reconstruction. Peace-
building cannot be achieved without the participation of the younger generation. But this gen-
eration must be given a frame within which it can develop and distance itself from traumatic 
wartime childhoods and a cultural and social environment that would never come back. The 
first aspect goes without saying, but is difficult to transfer into policy; the second aspect is, of 
course, a challenge for conservative and backward ideologists who, in hindsight, believe that 
any of the circumstances from before the war can be regained. The internationals, advisors, 
the World Bank, military etc. repeated the Kosovo mistake; Higher Education was considered 
as one element of civil administration. While literacy and the development of an elementary 
school system were high on the list of priorities, Higher Education remained within the con-
servative mainstream, just in need of material modernization – and by no means a threat to 
security and social stability. Thus, the Afghan government can hardly be blamed for not having 
ranked Higher Education as high on their list as it should have been. This is evident in the 
recent German-Afghan negotiations and the outcome of the Tokyo summit in summer 2012, 
when Higher Education was not placed on the priority list by the Afghan government, and con-
sequently not ranked highly by their German counterparts.19
Without crying over spilled milk, we can conclude that the main issues were not tackled seri-
ously after 2005. We cannot speak of good governance, of course, but even this good enough 
governance can be questioned. Awareness of the following list of insufficiencies and deficits is 
imperative for future political planning:
• Transition from high school to the tertiary sector is dysfunctional, corrupt and does 
not meet strategic goals, even if these goals may have been formulated appropriately.
• Firm legal standards for the tertiary sector, delineation between universities and 
other institutions, private and public, creating an internationally recognized minimal 
provision for accreditation (the best would be a comprehensive law with large ele-
ments of autonomy for each institution) - this is the decisive interface between RoL 
and welfare sections of good governance. Since academic degrees and titles must be 
recognized outside the system, and it is likely that a big portion of graduates will need 
this recognition, what is presently the case is a dead end policy.
19 Information by the Foreign Office (AA) 2012/10/16.
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• Regulations of the social, financial and gender aspects of application for admission 
and enrolment are “virtual” and do not reflect the real situation. This is one of the 
critical interfaces with security, as the number of unsatisfied pre- and in-university 
people is steadily growing.
• Massive enlargement of the supply with academic subjects and degrees in fields that 
have been gravely neglected or are still missing in the calendar is needed. Based only 
on this condition, a selective, fair and uncorrupted system of admission and enrol-
ment can be implemented.
• Basic rules for self-government and recruitment of academic and administrative po-
sitions are missing; division of powers between the state and the autonomous acade-
mic performance does not exist.
• A national system of uncorrupted rules for examinations and the validation of de-
grees is still missing.
• Special provisions for teacher training under the supervision of the MoHE, and in 
cooperation with ME, are hampered by an endless quarrel about competence and 
spheres of influence between the two ministries.
• Creation of a basic research capacity in most academic disciplines based on the uni-
versity (and not outsourcing researching before you have it) is almost non-existent. 
Higher Education research, economics of Higher Education, demographics etc. are 
underdeveloped or non-existent. Sometimes, the potential outcome of research in 
these disciplines is substituted by foreign think tanks and policy determination, 
which is the case in Afghanistan.
• Last but not least, and most important of all in terms of political considerations, 
new rules for social protection of all students and their social and cultural environ-
ment on campus are needed. This implicates the questions of tuition costs and fees, 
housing and food, transportation and health care.
Anyone can see that even this long list is incomplete. One of the major problems that are dif-
ficult to tackle is the fact that, in terms of recognition and appreciation, the entire tertiary 
sector is fixated on the image of “The University” as the old former generator of a small elite. 
Thus, “real” universities like Kabul and Herat and Mazar etc. are competing with other, valu-
able, institutions that do not meet any international standard for universities and can hardly 
be compared to advanced professional or vocational training institutions. This combination of 
deficiencies has created a dangerous mix of sentiments, status decrease for all those who do not 
attend a real university and much uncertainty about the level to be aspired. We should keep in 
mind that there is also a delivery of symbolic public goods that has a very real impact on social structures 
and placement on certain status levels.
It is not our aim in this paper to suggest specific reforms or quick-impact steps to be taken by 
the Afghan authorities with the help of international experts and donors. But let us have two 
paragraphs on some parameters for reforms are still missing. 
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To be very clear about one aspect of reforms, neither the German model (universities and uni-
versities of applied science), nor the American model (research universities, comprehensive 
universities, four year colleges and community colleges), nor any other can be transferred di-
rectly to Afghanistan. But, given the location and the capacity of existing universities, a combi-
nation of the two models could be a solution for Afghan Higher Education; this was discussed 
during the Golden Hour, under Minister Fayez. Six universities could offer advanced undergrad-
uate, graduate and post-graduate studies, while the other colleges and teacher education institu-
tions could provide bachelor degrees and access to universities for their graduates, and teacher 
training could be included in all institutions. But as a novelty of maximum effectiveness and 
efficiency, community colleges should be built in all provinces, bridging the gap between high 
school and academic proficiency, and easing the access to Higher Education of young women 
and students from remote areas. The plans of Minister Fayez went in this direction, but were 
dissolved in stagnation after his resignation.
Example 2:
We want to present one example in which explicit changes in Higher Education 
governance opened a promising window, but did not come to fruition for political 
reasons, and without strengthening any other segment of statehood. The example 
is the establishment of an Afghan Rectors Conference (ARC). On behalf of the 
German Foreign Office and with monetary support from the German Academic 
Exchange (DAAD), Michael Daxner served as an expert advisor and after 2004 as 
Principal International Advisor, to Minister Fayez. In this capacity he was mainly 
engaged in legislation, planning and institutional reforms. It should be mentioned 
that the draft of a Higher Education bill was complete by mid-2004 and was then 
taken off the table by the President because of the upcoming elections, as to not 
compromise parliamentary powers. Today, proper Higher Education legislation 
has still not passed parliament, for a variety of reasons. Thus, the RoL aspect of 
Afghan Higher Education was deficient from the beginning. 
On another front, progress seemed to be more promising; with strong support 
from the German Rectors Conference (HRK) and international networks (IAU, 
UNESCO etc.), ARC was established in 2004/5. All universities – nineteen at the time 
– participated, and their chancellors, vice-presidents or rectors were represented. 
For the first time, a woman was a full member, and even vice-president of the ARC. 
The aim was to establish a strong representation of Higher Education vis-a-vis 
the state in order to create some institutional autonomy (given the homologous 
structure of all universities, the ARC worked as any of those institutions would, 
with the exception that the minor colleges that did not deserve the title university 
and thus played a less consolidating role). A female Secretary General was 
established and supported by Germany. Everything looked fine, and there were 
debates about the way Higher Education governance could be shared between the 
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state (Ministry of Higher Education) and the colleges. When Minister Fayez had 
to step down because of an ideological backlash in policy, mainly against secular 
tendencies and modernization in the super-structure after the elections of 2004/5, 
the end of ARC was quickly decided. The new Minister, an Islamist, re-established 
state-rule over all aspects of Higher Education and limited the political influence 
of foreign actors; DAAD gave in immediately, and HRK and other supporters had 
no perspective in further assisting the project. In terms of governance, ARC could 
have been an organization that would have strengthened statehood by limiting the 
role of the state. This would have required new institutions, similar to processes 
like accreditation, quality assurance, etc. What we have now in this field of 
institutional autonomy is a bureaucratic vertical system of top down governance 
which does nothing to aid the image of the state or strengthen statehood.
An epilogue is useful for understanding how this example links to considerations about pub-
lic and private universities. Ex-Minister Fayez, who had been a staunch advocate of state-run 
public universities, now turned to private non-profit models. He became founding president 
of AUAF, but he also spoke out for academic freedom and institutional autonomy, and thus 
became something of a positive exception among his colleagues: highly respected, but without 
much power. One of his aims clearly points at a PPP-aspect of governance: instead of the ARC, 
he has proposed an “Association of Afghan Universities” which would act as a horizontal buffer 
institution between the state and the universities.
It would have been a promising approach to implement the elements of reforms as listed above 
within the framework of a straight-forward legislation and with the continuous support of the 
international community of higher education, represented by organization such as the IAU, 
the IAUP, UNESCO etc., and financed through a consortium of the World Bank and EU, with 
bilateral segments assigned to the major agencies from strong donor states, such as US (USAID), 
Germany (DAAD, GIZ), Japan (Jica) etc. A lack of national leadership and a flawed international 
coordination together created a slow and poorly coordinated growth of the Higher Education 
system as a whole and of some of its pivotal sectors in particular.
That is not to say that nothing has been achieved in the past ten years, but what has happened 
is insufficient and not sustainable.
This picture of the Afghan Higher Education system will meet grim reactions from all those 
who point at their (successful) attempts to establish reforms in their respective fields and 
niches. We concede that a lot of things have happened during the last ten years, and we can 
make a long list of more or less successful implementations of programs. We even admire 
some of the real accomplishments, such as the completion of the Herat Campus or the taking 
over of responsibility for a comprehensive development of Kandahar by USAID. But, all in all, 
these attempts remain islands in a rather chaotic sea. The main problems, as listed above, are 
not much closer to being solved than they were five years ago. Our conclusion is even harsher 
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than that: because the isolated reform projects lack sustainability, the conditions for improved 
governance by the central government and the local institutional leaders are dim. 
At this point we can present a dual continuation. On the one hand, it is possible to analyse and 
evaluate reform programs and ongoing projects with regard to their potential effects on the sys-
tem and indirectly on conditions for better governance within an existing frame. This is done 
in some parallel research20. On the other hand and this is what we are going to do here, one can 
analyse certain phenomena of deficient governance in context. In our conclusion we will take 
up this split again and elaborate on it in view of our results.
The functions of Higher Education for the stabilization and consolidation of Afghanistan permit 
two critical questions:
• What are the empirical findings and strong hypotheses that can support the long list 
of insufficiencies and disappointed expectations as listed above?
• Is it possible to imagine partial relief from these insufficiencies by more strongly ta-
king into account some off-state developments and some hybrid governance growing?
The answers to the first questions come from the empirical field work of the authors and a 
rather in-depth analysis of available policy papers and strategic statements on Higher Educa-
tion. While the field work has a continuous history dating to 2003 (Michael Daxner), the litera-
ture offers a good overview on the educational and institutional level, but only poor accounts 
on governance and micro- social phenomena, and almost no clear links to the fields of security, 
status-distribution and the political impact of Higher Education. The situation is much better 
in areas like employability, placement and professional qualification. Both authors have tried to 
condense the findings and assumptions here.
The second question is closely related to findings we have from different research projects, such 
as in C 9, corruption research and other related investigations.
Since this working paper is meant to give brief insight into a special sector, it has not been 
deemed necessary to present a comprehensive and complete overview of all problems men-
tioned. Instead, we have chosen exemplary segments to make our approach understood. Since 
many empirical statements are drawn from personal sources that must be protected, we don’t 
give names in certain cases. These sources are available for confidential examination.
4.1  Neither private nor public – the exceptional case of the American University of 
Afghanistan
Higher Education is a paradigmatic testing field for PPP everywhere. If Higher Education 
governance decides that delivering Higher Education aims more at the individual reward by 
20  Research for interveners’ governments provides much insight, cf. documents by the Congressional 
Research Services (U.)., or the German Foreign Office’s (AA) regular progress reports since 2010. One of 
the internationally best accounted for sources is the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN). Specifically 
directed to HE, cf. bibliography and sources by  Daxner/Schrade (2012).
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accumulating all sorts of capital, then quality and access will be organized as club goods, i.e. 
shielded from the broader public by high tuition fees and strict rules for admission. If the 
state decides that Higher Education will bring more accumulated gains for the entire society 
and the state, access will be open and tuition will be nil or low. However, Higher Education 
is never a completely common good because of the requirements and duties connected with 
active enrolment. There are extreme examples for both strategies; highly elitist and expensive 
special Higher Education institutions are more likely to reproduce an elite class within an 
elite class, and seldom excel proportionately in terms of advances in research and good study, 
while entirely open Higher Education institutions will not satisfy the aspirations of students 
by abandoning deferred gratification21. In developing societies, the normal way of operating 
Higher Education is to strengthen good enough study – curriculum, professional education, 
disciplinary basics – and reduce aspirations to conduct research. In many countries this 
leads to a divided Higher Education system: cheap, popular fields of study – such as business 
management, accounting, some parts of media and IT studies, journalism, modern languages – 
tend to be privatized and serve a broad public demand, promising good profits, while expensive 
studies – medicine, engineering, sciences, and mass studies like teacher training and law that 
need state supervision – remain public institutions and are permanently underfinanced.
The first minister of Higher Education, Prof. Fayez (2002-2005) tried to overcome this split and 
tended towards a totally reformed open access Higher Education system with moderate tuition 
fees for everybody and an end of discipline-oriented differentiation in fees and faculty salaries. 
He failed on all these reforms.
Not only out of understandable frustration, but also encouraged by the major intervention force 
– the U.S. – he founded the American University of Afghanistan. Today, it is probably the best 
undergraduate college in the country, on a level above community college and below a tradi-
tional 4-year-university in the Western system.
The idea for AUAF was brought up in 2002 by Laura Bush and gained support from then Am-
bassador Khalilzad. While the foundation was made possible by a remarkable appropriation 
of U.S. funds by the Congress, today the AUAF relies primarily on significant donations by Af-
ghan major businesses and generates extra income through high tuition fees, ameliorated by 
a sophisticated system of grants and stipends that support >70% of all students. Standards are 
significantly higher than the comparable average in all other Higher Education institutions, 
and intra-college violence does not exist22. It is notable that ISAF, the intervention force, gave 
AUAF a newspaper headline in 2009: “Higher Education is set up to soar”23. In this article, the 
21 However, the populist approach of Buarque and others promises “democracy” instead of “scientif-
ic achievements”, something like science by the people instead of science for the people: Cristovam 
Buarque, Minister for Higher Education in Brazil 1995-1999.
22 http://auaf.edu.af., retrieved 2013.04.22.
23 http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/higher-education-set-to-soar-in-Afghanistan (by Alexandre 
Brecher-Dolivet). Retrieved 2013.04.22.
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advantages of AUAF were described in the light of the quantitative problems and linked to a 
need for better quality.
Formally, AUAF is entirely private and thus leads a growing market of non-public universities 
and colleges (see above). However, both accreditation/licensing and the operational conditions 
for such a college require a strong interplay with the state, i.e. Ministry of Higher Education, 
local security authorities and patrons.
We can learn from this example that Higher Education governance is strongly institution-driv-
en insofar as rules and norms are better served in AUAF than in the public institutions, and 
thus it is a competitor with all other universities and a model for these at once. We can also 
learn that the communication with the public is important. Clients (students), donors and au-
thorities create a high level of legitimacy that is sustained by the effects from programs and re-
wards. One of the prices is the high rate of employment of foreign faculty as academic teachers. 
If ownership comes into the picture, it is more students’ ownership than a diffuse public that 
recognizes AUAF as “theirs”.
4.2 Higher Education and Good Governance II – Transition Challenge
Since 2010, it has been officially known that ISAF combat forces will pull out of Afghanistan by 
2014. 2010 was also the year when the German government published its first assessment on the 
intervention, followed by a second one in 2011. In December 2011, a grand conference marked 
a decade since the Bonn Conference of 2001. In the run-up of this conference, and in the wake 
of its final resolution, Transition and outlook till 2024 marks another decade of reconstruction 
in Afghanistan. In May 2012, a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Germany on future 
cooperation was signed (Bundesregierung 2012). A few days before that, the bilateral agreement 
between Afghanistan and the U.S. was signed (Government 2012), waiting for detailed elabora-
tion24. These documents, among others, can be taken as significant for a new policy, linked 
to “Transition”. This is of importance for two reasons in our context. One is in the sphere 
of political psychology, the other in the domain of governance. The first aspect of transition 
is an almost generally shared appearance of “relief ”, as if transition could heal whatever has 
gone wrong during ten years of intervention. We won’t go deeply into this change of mood, 
but simply say that it is influencing all discourses on the relationship between interveners and 
the intervened. When Ambassador Steiner said in the wake of the Bonn Conference 2011 that 
transition could be used for correcting earlier mistakes, the message was clear. Many reforms, 
most of them in the non-military sector, will get another chance to get started before 2014, with 
24 There is a pompously signed document; but all detailed provisions for implementations are still open, 
inter alia the question of impunity for US soldiers and the extra number of troops. President Karzai 
has recently stated that he is not in a hurry to get the documents signed (Reuters, 08/24/2013). Only 
the details will show how deep the impact and intrusion of the hegemonial partner in this relation-
ship will be in all sectors of governance, including, rather prominently, education. How intensely will 
the self-perception of the Afghan people be determined by the knowledge and interpretation of the 
American lead agencies and think tanks working with US policies towards Afghanistan?  (Cf. Daxner 
2013 forthcoming: Endgame Afghanistan, CAS, Leipzig,  Working Papers Series, Nr. 3)
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an outlook towards 2024. The other aspect is more important for our debate. From the very first 
international conference on Afghanistan – and there have been many of them since 2001 – gov-
ernance was one of the key issues of debate, the other being security.
Some general considerations about trends in Afghan governance development considering 
education and higher education: Education has never become priority in the reform programs 
and plans. Despite the fact that cooperation on all fields of education is a recurring topic in all 
bilateral agreements and international resolutions, it has never become such prominence in 
direct negotiations (this information is unofficial, of course, but even ranking experts in the 
Foreign Office (AA) complained to me after the Bonn (2011) and Tokyo (2012) Conferences that 
the afghan side did not give the whole education very high priority. From the German side, the 
absolute priority is given to vocational and professional training. 
As a part of welfare and the normative effects from the rule of law, education is normally shaped 
on the system level. It’s effects, however, affect the people on the basis of society. Only here, the 
education system becomes empirical. On the micro-level of society there is the power of the 
life-world (Lebenswelt), which is still decisive for the effects from education policy. This truism 
has far-reaching effects on governance.
Table 5: The following picture shows the structure of the conflict
 
BACHELOR 
PROGRAM 
High School Graduation 
Doctoral Studies,other post-
graduate programs 
MASTER 
PROGRAM 
The symbolizes the major conflict zone in a tertiary system: the transition from the 
previous level into the next. There may be several barriers, often combined: entrance exami-
nations, tuition fees, invisible admission restrictions (gender, ethnic background) and an ir-
rational subject distribution. It should be clear that all drop outs from the selection process 
do not automatically get admitted or aim at getting admitted to non-academic professional or 
vocational training.
At this point we want to demonstrate how much the critical conflict-zone is related to both good 
governance and several aspects of statehood, as well as to some fundamental problems of the re-
building of Afghan society. The following are a few hypotheses with far-reaching consequences:
(1) So far, the conflicts over admission to the tertiary sector are mainly problems of ur-
ban areas and the vicinity of university locations.
(2) Thus, the conflicts may be confined to the emerging middle classes, which are trying 
to enlarge their range of relational power in society.
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(3) The prognosis is, however, that the conflicts will widen and deepen when the access 
to tertiary education becomes an element of higher importance for all areas of the 
country, including those areas that are remote and secluded. This will have an imme-
diate effect on patronage networks and corruption.
The relation between these hypotheses and governance is evident. But we must go more into 
detail in order to explain what we need to test the hypotheses and what we understand so far 
about the context.
First of all, what do we already know?
The admission conflict as a variety of the town/country divide is ubiquitous. Urban strata tend 
traditionally towards higher education because of their bigger share in literacy and, even more 
so, because of the higher esteem of social and cultural capitals conveyed by education titles. 
But this is a rather Western statement, as the nexus only exists if the value of cultural capital 
is unevenly distributed and if the delivery of titles and employability through Higher Education 
fulfils the expectations of the DFG. We know that the indirect effect of admission policies affects 
local governance, because patronage has to select certain persons – on request of clients or as 
a reward for members of a patronage network – for a post-secondary career in Higher Educa-
tion. We can only assume, but do not know exactly, if different governance zones have adopted 
“policies” to stabilize an admission strain from the local level to the education centres higher 
up – centralized – and eventually to Higher Education proper.
Secondly: we can draw solid lines between diverse fields of governance. We want to link secu-
rity governance to delivery in Higher Education. As partners of the Scholars at Risk Network 
(SAR)25, we have started to build up a network reporting on violent incidents in Higher Educa-
tion. These include killings, violent attacks, threats and other violations of laws and rules. It 
is too early for a conclusion, but our first reports show the direction of future investigations. 
Two recent incidents at universities show exemplarily the tight enmeshment of universities 
and politics in Afghanistan and that campuses are microcosmic mirrors of pressing national 
issues. In November 2012, sectarian violence broke out at Kabul University when Sunni Mus-
lim students tried to prevent Shiite Muslim students from celebrating the Ashura festival in-
side a dormitory mosque. Hundreds of students were involved in the clashes, several of them 
were injured and one was killed. According to observers, the violent component of the quarrels 
significantly increased at the moment when non-student activists from both sectarian groups 
joined the conflict. Likewise, non-student activists had fueled violence in student clashes that 
hit the headlines only two month earlier. In September 2012, when President Karzai announced 
his intention to rename Kabul’s University of Education after former Tajik leader Burhanud-
din Rabbani, Pashtu and Hazara students protested. While initially peaceful, the opposition 
turned violent when non-student supporters of the name change converged on the protesters. 
25 http://Scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu, retrieved 2013.04.22. This human rights advocacy group is perhaps the most 
prominent organization dedicated to practically supporting endangered scholars and – at least temporarily - 
providing safe havens for them in democratic countries and in adequate academic environments.
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Both incidents exemplify one of the most crucial societal challenges in the country, namely the 
increasing fractionalization along ethno-religious lines. The most important lesson to draw 
from the two incidents is that Afghan campuses are not only hotbeds for ideological formation 
and political protest, but also venues of concrete violent conflict. Among other things, it is this 
potential for actual violence that directly links Afghan universities to security governance.
What we can learn from our observations is the importance of the relationship between local 
governance and policies by the central authorities of the state (Presidency, ministries, vice-
chancellors and chancellors of universities). Example 2 in this excerpt shows many of the sig-
nificant elements of our initial analysis of security threats in Higher Education.
5. Preliminary Conclusions
The transition period up through 2014 offers decisive chances for institution building in Af-
ghanistan. Many donor countries are looking for sustainable civilian areas to comply with their 
pledges to further support Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Education has always been a model 
field for demonstrating continuous commitment. However, if this is true for elementary and 
secondary education, it is much less a reality in the world of higher education. Our working 
paper attempts to demonstrate how complex the effects of higher education in any society are 
and how they will affect concretely the future development of Afghanistan.
The basic argument is that one should not begin with established higher education planning and 
implementation structures, but rather by analysing the functions of universities and the entire 
tertiary sector of education. Universities are among the most stable institutions in history, com-
parable only to the military, rural communities and families. The rules of creating knowledge 
beyond the level of common sense, i.e. theoretical knowledge, challenge views on the world – and 
without such rules, neither governance nor progress can be imagined. Professional education 
of teachers, lawyers, clerics and clerks is the backbone of creating governance in areas of robust 
statehood. This is a process that has developed over the centuries, and many challenges target the 
strong role of an institution that provides the functional integration of knowledge into systems 
of power, being critical to social differentiation, the formulation of rules and comprehension, 
the transfer of values and literacy from one generation to the next, and, last but not least, the 
enhancement of the dynamics of socio-economic development by producing new knowledge. 
Fields like teacher education show immense impact on whole generations of mindsets.
For Afghanistan, we have identified four major fields in society that all are strongly affected by 
Higher Education institutions:
• Social stratification
• Security
• Economic development
• Educational dynamics and qualification
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The four fields are interrelated. If the democratic elite cannot be developed by a national system 
of Higher Education, the dependence on foreign hegemony is likely to be perpetuated. If the 
aspirations of the young generation to become part of this democratic elite are disappointed 
because they were not allowed to attain cultural and social capital through academic study, this 
generation is likely to become radicalized and susceptible to ideological and violent ideas. If 
the country does not build a solid research base focused on its own history, territorial circum-
stances and society, the entire society will depend on foreign think tanks, external expertise and 
alienating concepts of self-perception. If the remarkable functional differentiation in society 
is not reflected in the system of degrees, authorization and licensing by the state, the emerging 
middle classes will try to bypass their own system of higher education and escape into foreign 
systems and private elitism.
This list of conditions could be extended easily. Afghanistan has no glorious, though normal 
history of Higher Education as a property of small urban elites (cf. Ruttig 2012). This history 
was rudely interrupted by 30 years of war, occupation and unrest. After the intervention of 2001, 
reconstructing education was a priority for interveners and most local groups. However, the 
key interest was primary and secondary education. The tertiary sector, including teacher educa-
tion, research bases and an enlargement of disciplines, was neglected for various reasons. This 
negligence is now endangering not only the entire system of education, but the sustainable 
development of the country as a whole.
Our working paper has shown some detailed explanation for both the reasons for and the ef-
fects of the denied priority of higher education. As is the case with many other humanitarian 
military interventions, Higher Education has not been given much attention at the negotiations, 
e.g., in writing the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Even under strong efforts to thoroughly reform the 
entire system of Higher Education in 2002-2005, the effects remained poor, because the central 
government did not care enough about the implications, and the international donors did not 
coordinate their attempts to provide a solid foundation for a new system in compliance with 
the global standards of the community of higher education. After 2005, many reforms stagnated 
or even failed completely. The failure to provide adequate legislation and structures was bad 
enough, but even more devastating was the fact that neither quantitative growth (i.e. admis-
sions and diversification of disciplines) nor academic freedom and institutional autonomy was 
provided. Apart from these fundamental shortcomings, all other conflicts and weaknesses of 
the system can be described as normal for any emerging system of higher education in a poor 
country. But Afghanistan is not only poor; it is a country recovering from thirty years of war. It is 
a country stripped of many of its authentic roots and continuities. It is a society of intervention, 
caught up between interveners and the intervened. Under such circumstances, the function of 
higher education for peace-building, economic development and the accumulation of cultural 
and social capital should not be underestimated.
At this point, we have to choose between two consequential procedures: we can – as we have 
done in our study for the Foreign Office (Daxner and Schrade 2012) – develop a policy paper on 
the requirements of an adequate and realistic Higher Education policy, in lieu of the Afghan 
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planning capacity, and in cooperation with it under the imperative of ownership. Our other op-
tion is to discuss the consequences from our considerations for the diverse dimensions of gov-
ernance. We have – for this working paper – decided to restrict ourselves to the latter. While the 
SFB, on the brink of its 3rd phase, concentrates on legitimacy and effectiveness of governance, 
it is also evident that a strong top down “unified” Higher Education policy is needed to allow 
for effective governance regarding access and fair delivery of recognized titles and authoriza-
tion by Higher Education (this central prevalence of Higher Education policy is one effect of 
globalization, because the actors want to exchange and recognize all titles and authorizations 
on a horizontal level that is still mainly ordered by nation-states and their rules. Germany finds 
itself in the unfortunate situation that it is experiencing true disadvantages as a result of its 
federal system Higher Education accountabilities). But, as in all education and health systems, 
the impact of any Higher Education policy affects individuals first of all (and only individu-
als). No personal learning process can be substituted by a collective. Of course, communities 
of learners or students can compensate for uneven distribution of learning effects, but in the 
end, it is still the personal, individual learner that is at the end of the delivery chain of Higher 
Education. The individuals are certainly bound into their “life-world”. Their embedded social 
life follows the rules of their respective social order, which is by no means homogeneous and 
does not congruently reflect the Afghan statehood or governance order, including the shadow 
of hierarchy; instead, it reflects the fragmented structure of society. This creates a necessary an-
tagonism between the system (central government Higher Education policy) and the life-world 
at a local level. In terms of research, it is interesting to learn more about the clash of the two; 
the little that we know already would indicate that good governance within admission policy at 
a local level could provide effective relief for the problems of sending local youth to the upward 
careers through education – if, and only if, the quantitative capacities and a minimum quality 
assurance would receive them at the community colleges, colleges and universities in the cen-
tral habitats of the country. This is not the case, and thus we do not find good governance in this 
sector, indeed, not even good enough governance.
Since the country is by no means so backward that local communities do not know about the 
importance of getting a new generation enhanced by Higher Education, a conflict is inevitable. 
Upward mobility will be blocked, and this blockage will no longer be part of a “natural” dis-
tribution of chances and disadvantages. The traditional balance between the rural community 
sending some of its youth to study in the Higher Education centres and expecting that at least 
some of them return to their home communities afterward, which would support local devel-
opment, as a process, cannot start.
Our research in project C9 of the SFB has no such themes in its focus; however, indirectly, some 
indicators for stability, i.e. the availability of girls’ schools, and the education of government 
employees, play into our arguments.
Any policy-assessment would state that it is late, if not too late, to improve Higher Education 
governance. Donors’ aid is still not concentrated on Higher Education; German international 
cooperation has refrained from effectively supporting Higher Education reforms. It is only in 
the field of vocational and professional training, especially in public administration, that there 
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are effective measures. US supports targeted projects in universities, e.g. in Kandahar, and is 
obviously willing to invest more in reforms of community colleges. Altogether, there are no 
effective strategies to gain control over the most urgent problems: admission of more than 
250.000 first year students, reform of the Konkor and purging the examination system from 
corruption. In all three fields, “good enough governance” is an inappropriate term for what can 
and should be expected.
Legitimacy for reforms would be increased by further opening the universities and increasing 
their capacity to admit student and enrol them in many more disciplines than are available 
today. . There is no effective governance in the rural areas, which widens the gap between them 
and the urban populations. In urban areas, there are at least institutions of Higher Education 
that can or may be reformed. But as this is not the case, the misery is nationwide.
The argument – also discussed in the SFB (Project A12) - that ownership runs the risk of being 
corrupted by the unwillingness and/or inability of local actors to adopt minimum standards 
in human rights, is valid. However, it was not heard by the German Foreign Office regarding 
reform models for Higher Education (with the paradox that the relatively weak Presidential Pal-
ace would actually support such reforms more than the responsible ministry would be capable 
of doing, if, and only if, the international support was be more significant and stronger). Own-
ership is a rhetorical and symbolic trap in cases where a country with limited statehood cannot 
build sustainable structures in a central sector of its welfare governance.
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